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Introduction  
Cyber-law-making is one of the most challenging fields of global governance because 
there State-centric regulatory and governance structures of public international law clash 
with the reality of private actors as war generators, civil society collides with 
international organisations and State and transnational regulators catch up with technical 
realities. Cybersecurity at global level is deadlocked between China, Russia and the EU, US 
and other parts of the developed world and a Global Pact remains elusive. For the EU as 
an emerging actor, the challenges in this field are magnified because they relate to its 
incomplete and uneven competences, and a patchwork-quilt of emerging actors, practices 
and rules. Efforts to develop ‘global’ standards, for example, the Budapest Convention, are 
depicted to constitute more esoteric instruments, rather than holistic standard-setting 
(Council of Europe, 2001). The EU has undertaken considerable efforts at cyber law-
making over the course of two decades (Fahey, 2014). However, the EU has approached 
cyber regulation with a particularly unwieldly mix of powers, sanctions and 
agencification.  
 
One of the most significant features of widespread scholarship on the EU as a cyber-actor 
has been its overwhelming direction towards focus on the EU as a unified, coherent and 
effective actor (e.g. Carrapiço and Barrinha, 2018).  Cyber law-making arguably exposes 
the EU self-evidently as a weak global governance actor, conflicted, beholder to private 
actors and vexed by its competences- but also highly innovative and transparent. EU cyber 
action is significant in understanding EU integration practices because it exposes a 
partially institutionalised field, with incomplete and awkwardly non-intersecting 
competences, straddling incomplete Security and Digital Single Market policies, evolving 
sanctions and new agencies.  
 
Cyber laws and policies fall as a law-making exercise only partly within EU security. In the 
context of the EU, the awkward and contestable imbalance between the ’F’ ‘S’ and ‘J’ of the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice remains a complex endeavour. Scholarship is 
divided between the operationalised formula of Justice and Home Affairs and the political 
and legal reality of AFSJ. The rapid growth of EU security institutions, norms and 
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capacities has been shown not to lead to the convergence of national systems and a 
corresponding rapid growth of the use of these resources. EU security institutionalisation 
has been shown to not necessarily correlate to the building of efficient supranational 
systems (Ekengren and Hollis, 2019; Buono, 2012). However, the incompleteness of the 
EU in this field may easily be overstated. Major efforts have taken place recently to 
develop new autonomous AFSJ systems, actors and practices, from evolutions of existing 
AFSJ agencies to new systems in databases e.g. as Europol (Regulation 2016/794), 
Eurojust (Regulation 2018/1727) or a European Border and Coast Guard 
(Regulation (EU) 2016/162), eu-LISA (Regulation (EU) 2018/1726), ETIAS-TCN 
(Regulation (EU) 2019/816) etc is significant in crisis-related times. Certain ‘new entities’ 
e.g. European Border and Coast Guard as independent EU agencies represent a continuing 
trend of agencification of the AFSJ and its gradual institutionalisation. Cyber law-making 
awkwardly traverses the AFSJ incompletely and demonstrates its challenges in this 
regard (Christou, 2019).  
 
The EU is globally unique in its commitment to internal and external institutionalisation 
practices (Fahey, 2018). Institutionalisation forms a spectrum for analysis which is 
‘process-based’ and possibly incomplete or is dynamic and under development (Fahey, 
2018, 1-8). Institutionalisation incorporates a sliding scale of minimalist enforcement, 
bottom-up processes of development, accountability processes, stabilisation and 
actorness all merging together as part of a ‘process’ narrative. A legal view of 
institutionalisation is necessarily ‘bottom up’, piecing together a range of instruments, 
regimes, practices, norms and enforcement issues. It may involve a consideration of rights 
and effectiveness of good governance and how existing institutions shape norms. It is a 
valuable metric of the evolution of EU policies.  
 
 The EU’s capacity to generate new configurations of institutions, for its own actors to 
evolve as agencies or quasi-agencies into autonomous agencies and to generate new 
international institutions is a core feature of EU law-making in the global legal order. 
Externally, the EU has a recent history of promoting and nudging institutional multilateral 
innovations, from the International Criminal Court, a UN Ombudsman to a Multilateral 
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Investment Court (Fahey, 2018). It is proposing large-scale reform of the WTO on the 
verge of institutional collapse. Internally, the EU struggles with partial institutionalisation 
as a solution to many complex policy fields e.g. migration and Eurozone (Caparaso, 2018). 
For example, in the most crisis-ridden domains of the EU, partial-institutionalisation and 
incomplete architectural design (legal, political, structural) is often at root of major 
challenges. Yet institutionalisation has broadly positive goals when pursued by the EU.  
 
The EU as a cyber-actor appears to institutionalise cyber-matters increasingly yet is also 
subject to an increasingly wide variety of subjects and objects that it cannot 
institutionalise. This will inevitably affect the ‘unitary’ ideal of EU action in this field. Major 
developments in EU cyber action internally and externally increasingly focus upon both 
institutionalisation and also the co-opting of private actors into governance which are 
argued here not to be consistent. Until recently, there had long been a lack of a unitary or 
central figure in EU cyber law-making with overarching responsibility for policy 
development.  Significant legal competences have been accorded in criminal law and AFSJ 
and CFSP law-making over successive treaty changes but this is not reflected in cyber law-
making. Indeed, the AFSJ has developed a significant portfolio of directives and 
regulations predicated upon maximum harmonisation and operationalisation in the post-
Lisbon era of the regularisation of the AFSJ (Fahey, 2014). Certain recent EU cyber law-
making developments do not necessarily reflect these developments, appearing to evolve 
in many different competence directions.  
 
 
This paper shows that the EU as a cyber-actor constitutes a significant example of EU 
institutionalisation taking place in practice, caught between complex global challenges 
and contested taxonomies. The EU harbours multiple conflicting definitions of cybercrime 
between actors and entities and multiple working definitions of cybersecurity. Some key 
terms also lack common definition in the EU context e.g. cyber defence, albeit as a key 
competence of the EU Member States, where it fails to draw from commonalities 
sufficiently. The EU lacks sufficiently robust institutions, agencies or actors and risks 
conflicts and impingement upon many fundamental rights through its partial 
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institutionalisation of a field. It also appears afflicted by paradoxically both over-
legalisation and under-legalisation of cyber law-making (Drewer and Ellermann, 2012). 
As a result, the EU as a Global cyber actor risks becoming an inadequate international 
partner through its own weak institutionalisation.  
 
The paper examines I) cyber law-making and its subjects and objects, II) the two key 
planks of internal cyber-law-making firstly cybercrime then III), cyber security, followed 
by a look at the cyber actors in IV, and, finally, by external considerations in V).  
 
I. INTERNAL EU CYBER LAW-MAKING  
The EU’s Security Union law-making: the thickening institutionalisation?   
a. EU Cyber law-making: on subjects and objects 
Although not unique to law-making beyond the State, arguably one of the most complex 
elements of cyber law-making is its mainly composite and multi-level structure (Fahey, 
2018). Cyber law-making, from cybercrime to cybersecurity, governance and regulation 
appears increasingly defined by private actors standards, regimes and roles who assume 
by both stealth and also by design significant roles in regimes (Carrapiço and Farrand, 
2018). The freedom from regulation and governance has ‘iconically’ defined cyber 
regimes from the outset (e.g. the internet), giving private actors the ultimate say (Barlow, 
1996) ― leaving others to catch up. 
 
The problematisation of cybercrime as a regulatory subject is long disputed which has 
rendered its progress thorny. There has long been much confusion about the risks posed 
by cybercrime and the consensus that it exists (Wall, 2007; 2008: 861, 862). Few national 
level prosecutions, fueled by reports of a high rate of cybercrime activity, render it 
problematic. Added to this is the role of external malware unconnected to the internet, for 
example, Stuxnet via a USB key, yet also commonly problematized as a form of cyber risk 
warranting regulation (Fahey, 2014; Bendiek and Porter, 2013). The Commission 
published its new Eurobarometer report on Internet security and cybercrime in early 
2019 showing that Europeans were increasingly concerned about cybercrime, with 79% 
of them believing that the risk of becoming a victim of cybercrime is greater than in the 
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past (Europeans’ Attitudes Towards Internet Security, 2019). Such statistics were 
published on the same day in the advent of the EP elections with data to the effect that the 
EU had passed 15 out of 22 legislative proposals on the EU Security Union by early 2019 
(European Commission, A Europe that Protects, 2019). 
 
This politicisation of EU cyber law-making is thus of much significance but it is also 
embedded in longer-term uncertainty as to subjects and objects. It is uncertainty which is 
borne out in the weak institutionalisation taking effect.  
 
Prior to this, however, the paper examines the nature of cyber law-making.  
 
II. Institutionalisating EU Cybercrime: (Third Generation) EU Criminal Law 
a. Overview 
EU Cybercrime law has evolved piecemeal and is scattered amongst legal instruments, 
which continues to bear upon its longer term evolution. EU Cybercrime policy is a 
relatively recent legislative phenomenon, ostensibly beginning with the Framework 
Decision on attacks against information systems in 2005 (Council Framework Decision 
2005/22/JHA, 2005). The Framework Decision provided for the criminalisation of online 
and offline conduct, provided for serious penalties and jurisdictional rules. However, the 
Commission Communication “Towards a general policy on fight against cybercrime” 
(2007) sought a broader policy framework and outlined key elements of desired EU 
Cybercrime policy to include increased law enforcement cooperation, public-private 
partnerships and international cooperation. The title of this communication underscores 
the evolving idea of EU cybercrime law and policy. The Commission Communication in 
2009 on Critical Information infrastructure Protection entitled “Protecting Europe from 
large-scale cyber-attacks and disruptions: enhancing preparedness, security and resilience” 
focused upon the threat posed by cyber-attacks and the need to secure information 
systems. This Communication was followed by proposed directives, which would repeal 
and update the provisions of the Framework Decision on attacks against information 
systems (Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and Council on attacks 
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against information systems and repealing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, 
2010). 
 
While some argue that soft law has been gradually replaced by hard law or actual 
legislation in the form of a Directive on cybercrime, a rising number of instances are also 
evident where private actors set standards, enforce them as judge and jury of conduct 
(Farrand & Carrapico, 2018). It is a trend increasingly evident not just in cybercrime but 
broadly in the external JHA as to cyber matters, a trend which also represents a 
worrisome state of EU governance and accountability standards (Christou, 2018). This 
role for the private sector has generated a complex balance of power as to the bottom up 
development of cybercrime.  
 
b. The legal basis for EU Cybercrime action: top-down ‘strength’? 
Internal EU cybercrime policy has historically been situated in an internal market 
rationale but perhaps mainly theoretically rather than practically (Fahey, 2014).  Internal 
EU cybercrime and security policies additionally have a relevance to the operation of the 
internal market, to the safety of consumers and the functioning of business. However, 
cybersecurity most recently takes its legal origins as CFSP measures. This bifurcated 
understanding of regulatory structures stands as an important reminder of the highly 
confused, incomplete traversing of ideas, institutions and actors afflicting cyber matters.  
 
Post-Lisbon, there are ostensibly several legal bases in the treaties outside of the internal 
market rationale to legislate in order to regulate cybercrime and security. For example, 
there are grounds in the treaties to legislate for procedural EU Criminal law in Article 82 
TFEU, allowing for the Parliament and Council to establish minimum rules to the extent 
necessary to facilitate mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions and police 
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters having a cross-border dimension. In Article 
83 TFEU, there is competence for the EU to enact substantive criminal law. More 
specifically, Article 83(1) TFEU provides that the Parliament and Council may establish 
minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal law offences and sanctions in the 
area of particularly serious crime with a cross border dimension resulting from the 
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impact of such offences or need to combat such offences jointly. This provision includes 
thereafter a list of crimes in which the EU has legislative competence which specifically 
includes terrorism. Article 83(2) TFEU also provides for harmonisation in the event to 
ensure the effective implementation of EU policy already subject to harmonisation 
measures. Post-Lisbon, a legal basis for cybercrime and cybersecurity seems easily 
grounded on these legal bases in respect of serious crime across borders. Put differently, 
terrorism does not appear as the only rationale of EU cyber policies and the emphasis on 
the impact of non-regulation of cybercrime on the internal market is notable.  The gap in 
the type of legal instruments emerging appears thus as significant. 
 
c. Directive 
A Directive adopted in late 2013 (hereafter the Cybercrime Directive) places emphasis in 
particular upon a Strategy to fight new methods of creating cybercrime, for example, large 
scale ‘botnets’ i.e. networks of computers with a cross-border dimension (see Directive 
2013/40/EU, 2013). It purports to criminalise access to systems, system interferences 
and data interference, with penalties from two to five years. It provides for an ostensibly 
unwieldy procedure in Article 12, whereby a Member State must inform the Commission 
where it wishes to take jurisdiction over offences outside its territory. An earlier version 
of the Cybercrime Directive has been criticised for its vague legal obligations and its over-
criminalisation, especially of ‘small-scale’ hackers. The Commission has invoked 
Eurobarometer surveys on cybercrime referencing the legal uncertainty surrounding 
protections for consumers making online payments to warrant the use of so-called ‘Third 
Generation’ EU Criminal law (European Commission Press Release IP/12/751, 2012; 
Fichera, 2013). However, in this regard, in contrast to the Framework Decision, it is not 
necessarily a superior regulatory instrument. As a Directive, disparities inherent in its 
implementation practices may cause its provisions to be unevenly interpreted across the 
Member States, which seems undesirable from the perspective of regulating holistically. 
It is worth noting that a ‘comprehensive’ vision of EU cybercrime law was mooted at the 
launch of the Directive by the Commission to include provisions for financial cybercrime, 
illegal Internet content, the collection, storage and transfer of electronic evidence, as well 
as more detailed jurisdiction rules, in the form of ‘comprehensive’ legislation operating in 
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parallel with the Convention, with non-legislative measures. It is a formulation of 
cybercrime law which has yet to materialise. 
 
Cybercrime is conventionally said to be differentiated from cybersecurity through 
temporal constructs one relating to the past, the other to the future (Bernik, 2014: 143). 
As will be argued here this temporal division is problematic from a broader EU law 
perspective because in many respects the division is highly constructivist and unduly 
separatist. Arguably, it precludes more logical and reflective thinking on the capacity of 
law to engage with systems which are innate complex to regulate. It also has no link to 
how the EU operationalised crime and security in cyber issues ― both are partially 
institutionalised but unlinked to ‘time’.  
 
It might be said that the internal market basis for cybercrime gives it the ‘fire power’ to 
generate strong actors and agencies, but whether this is the case remains to be seen. Thus 
far, this has not yet taken effect. It represents the most definitive locus for a strong 
institutionalisation and further agencification.  
 
It nonetheless has a specific link to cybersecurity, discussed next.  
 
 
III. Institutionalisating EU cybersecurity: A concept in search of a definition?  
a. Overview 
The historical absence of a common EU framework on cyber security has been the subject 
of much critique, from inside and outside the EU institutions, such as the European 
Parliament and ENISA, as is the absence of cyber-security strategies at national level. The 
EU’s law-making in cybercrime and cybersecurity begins in policy terms most concretely 
from its Cybersecurity Strategy in 2013 which defines cybersecurity extremely broadly. 
Cybersecurity is referred to as “safeguards and actions that can be used to protect the 
cyber domain, both in the civilian and military fields, from those threats that are 
associated with or that may harm its interdependent networks and information 
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infrastructure” (EU Cybersecurity Strategy, 2013: 3). What is significant about the 
Strategy is the dominance of security therein and the lack of specificity about the 
definition of cybercrime to be deployed. Others point to the narrower definition of 
cybersecurity used by the EU Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), 
distinguishing cybercrime, cyber espionage and cyber warfare (see Odermatt, 2018). 
Despite being explicitly a cybersecurity strategy the EU’s Strategy has a complex 
engagement with cybercrime therein relegated to “[…] a broad range of different criminal 
activities where computers and information systems are involved either as a primary tool 
or as a primary target” (EU Cybersecurity Strategy, 2013: 3).  
 
An overwhelming number of legal and policy documents relating to cybersecurity often 
begin with a conceptual discussion about what exactly cybersecurity means (Odermatt, 
2018). It is a term which is often ambiguous and ill-defined partly because of the evolving 
nature of the treats. It is not mentioned as a policy field in the EU treaties and there is no 
explicit basis for it in EU law largely because the EU has traditionally related to the 
economic effects of cyber-attacks in order to legislate in cybercrime (Odermatt, 2018). 
The EU’s Strategy for cyber security was finally published in early 2013 and it follows 
many less than successful or complete policy initiatives in this area. These include a 
proposal for an Networks and Information Policy in 2001, soft law strategies and various 
programmes, instruments and policies on so-called Critical Infrastructure, policies that 
did not establish binding legal obligations upon the operators of critical infrastructures 
(for example, European Commission Communication 298, 2001; European Commission 
Communication 251, 2006; European Commission Communication 14, 2009; Council 
Directive 2016/1148, 2016). This reliance upon soft law to regulate cyber risk has been 
overtaken. Cyber security is depicted in the EU’s Strategy as referring to ‘the safeguards 
and actions that can be used to protect the cyber domain, both in the civilian and military 
fields, from those threats that are associated with or that may harm its interdependent 
networks and information infrastructure’ (EUCSS, 2013: 3). This generates three 
definitional questions concerning cyber risk. Firstly, the relationship of Cyber Security 
and confidentiality of information with data protection matters is ostensibly of much 
significance from the type of harm formulation but is not reflected in the Strategy or its 
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legal tools, discussed next. Secondly, its definition presupposes the relevance of 
militarisation to it conceptually. The militarisation of cyber offences is perceived to be a 
distinctive feature of cyber security particularly in the US and accordingly, there is much 
debate concerning the application of international law relating to war on cyber-attacks 
(for example, Schmitt, 2013). While the text of the Council of Europe Convention itself 
does not mention terrorism, a listed activity on the website of the Council of Europe is 
cyber-terrorism. However, the Strategy does not appear to be substantively motivated by 
or governed by such concerns as to risk overall. Thirdly, the Strategy describes cybercrime 
to include a range of different criminal activities, not precisely as in the Convention, only 
approximately so (EUCSS, 2013; 3). Its definition of cybercrime has generated infelicities 
in its taxonomy, infelicities that have generated much critique and which impact upon its 
over-arching framework for institutionalisation, seemingly improbably in the current 
state of affairs (the European Data Protection Supervisor, 2013). 
 
This leads to the key Act developed in 2019. 
 
b. Cybersecurity ‘Act’, 2019: the beginnings of ‘strong’ institutionalisation? 
Some key EU Criminal law Directives deploy maximum harmonization on the bases of 
Article 82(2) and 83(1) TFEU in order to regulate the sexual exploitation of children 
online and child pornography as measures for judicial cooperation in criminal matters of 
the EU (e.g. Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and 
child pornography). On the one hand, examples such as this show the extraordinarily 
broad parameters of cyber matters. However, on the other hand there are even more 
striking developments. For example, on 13 September 2017 the Commission adopted 
a cybersecurity package predicated upon a Regulation formulated as a so-
called ‘Cybersecurity Act’ on the basis of Article 114 TFEU as an act in the context of the 
Digital Single Market Strategy (Regulation 2019/881/EU, 2019). As part of a so-called 
‘package’ the Act has the intention to set up a high level of cybersecurity, cyber resilience 
and trust within the Union with a view to ensuring the proper functioning of the internal 
market. The changes this new EU Regulation sought to bring about relate to both: a 
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comprehensive reform of ENISA and the creation of a certification framework. In reality, 
the Act is about a trend towards permanent agencification and governance of the private 
sector through their coopting in complex ways. It brings into sharp focus earlier efforts at 
development of EC3 as a desk in Europol, discussed below. The Agency established will 
thus ‘succeed’ ENISA as established by Regulation No. 526/2013 as a significant step in 
the agencification of cyber policies traversing a variety of domains ― and its consequent 
deeper institutionalisation. The Act thus represents a definitive step towards 
agencificiation through internal market competences. Yet other criminal law 
competences are not deployed and the nature of the use of the internal market may be 
said here to be ‘light’.  The weak definition of cybersecurity appears at root a core issue 
and a contributor to weak institutionalisation.  
However, as to cybersecurity, new CFSP cyber sanctions are also a core plank thereof and 
are discussed next.  
 
c. EU Cyber sanctions: ‘top-down’ Executive-led horizontalisation of the CFSP? 
The EU has adopted sanctions against 35 countries and four thematic sanctions regimes 
regarding chemical weapons and terrorism and most recently cyber sanctions and human 
rights (Portela 2019; EU Sanctions: A Key Foreign and Security Policy Instrument, 2018; 
Eckes, 2019; EU Sanctions Map, 2019).  The EU is the world’s second-most active user of 
restrictive measures after the United States (US). On 18 October 2018, the European 
Council adopted conclusions calling for work on the capacity to respond to and deter 
cyber-attacks through EU restrictive measures to be taken forward. As a follow up, on 17 
May 2019, the Council adopted the necessary legal acts establishing a framework for 
targeted restrictive measures to deter and respond to cyber-attacks with a significant 
effect which constitute an external threat to the Union or its Member States. These acts 
also allow for restrictive measures to be applied in response to cyber-attacks with a 
significant effect against third States or international organisations, pursuant to Article 
21 TEU. On 17 May 2019, the Council established a framework which allows the EU to 
impose targeted restrictive measures to deter and respond to cyber-attacks which 
constitute an external threat to the EU or its member states, including cyber-attacks 
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against third States or international organisations where restricted measures are 
considered necessary to achieve the objectives of the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) (Council Decision 7299/19, Council Conclusions 13/18, 2018). It is a 
striking executive-led legal formula to deploy. Yet it occurs in a field where the CJEU has 
become gradually more pervasive and extended its own powers of review in the area of 
the CFSP and so this tempers to some degree its executive-led nature (cf Eckes, 2019). 
It is also widely recognised that the United Kingdom (UK) is one of the driving forces 
behind the EU’s active sanctions policy, as are the Netherlands, both key targets of Russian 
foreign policy activities in recent times. How non-EU States will view this state of affairs 
remains to be seen e.g. who will align with EU CFSP cybersanctions and who will litigate 
them going forward constitute issues of note. To similar effect, how the post-Brexit 
constellation of States advocating innovative sanctions in foreign policy as a tool thereof 
remains to be seen or how executive-led cybersanctions policy will become. Sanctions 
constitute an ad hoc response of sorts and do not appear to represent a deeper 
institutionalisation, more so just mere widening.  
 
This leads to a broader discussion of actors and cyber law-making.  
 
 
IV. EU Cyber Actors: On Compartmentalisation 
a. Overview 
A variety of entities were initially involved in embryonic cyber policies, with both and 
internal and external mandate and all these entities contribute to the web of actors 
evolving here. The necessity of the number of entities has been explained as part of the 
knowledge-building or discovery process for the EU to build a cyber-regulatory structure. 
Responsibility for EU Cybercrime and cyber security was historically divided in the first 
post-Lisbon Commission between the Vice-President of the Commission, Nelie Kroes 
(Cyber security/Digital Agenda) and the then Commissioner for Home Affairs, Cecilia 
Malmstrom (Cybercrime). The original joint involvement of three Commission DG’s: 
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Home Affairs, Justice and Information Society, as well as numerous agencies in the 
development of an EU cyber strategy is indicative of the challenges of internal security 
which has a considerable external or global dimension and the development of an EU 
cyber strategy is touted also as a major success as regards inter-institutional cooperation.   
In the new Commission of 2019 cybercrime and security traverse DG Internal Market; DG 
Connect (CNECT) (DG CNECT: Communications Networks, Content & Technology). In 
charge of all directorates - Deputy Director-Khalil Rouhana; Directorate H Digital Society, 
Trust & Cybersecurity K. Rouhana (acting) H1 Cybersecurity Technology & Capacity 
Building - M. González-Sancho; H2 Cybersecurity & Digital Privacy Policy - J. Boratynski; 
Digital Single Market – Directorate F: Digital Single Market – Gerard de Graaf (as per 
01/12/2019) and DG HOME: General Migration and Home Affairs. Directorate D4 – 
Cybercrime – Cathrin Bauer-Bulst). It is a very broad, institutionalised and balanced 
composition of teams on one level, but also seeks to separate content in ways which are 
not necessarily aligned with actual law-making.  
 
Considerable differences between the two fields of digital single market and internal 
market exist from a legal perspective ― as an incomplete sub-field thereof despite the use 
of broader internal market legal policies here.  Security and internal market matters have 
a  complex intersection in cyber matters and it remains to be seen how much the legal and 
infrastructure support structures will be adequately aligned. For now, the 
compartmentalization of teams in no way relates to the putative or attempted 
institutionalisation of EU cyber law-making taking place.  
 
b. ENISA: Top-down and bottom-up institutionalisation?  
ENISA constitutes one of the earliest EU efforts at the institutionalisation of cyber law-
making. Originally, ENISA had a restricted mandate and liaised predominantly with 
largely national law enforcement bodies on the security aspects of cybercrime.  ENISA was 
involved in establishing the European cybersecurity certification framework by preparing 
certification and helping EU Member States who would request it to handle cybersecurity 
incidents, and supporting the coordination of the EU in case of large-scale cross borders 
cyber-attacks and crises. This task built on ENISA’s role as secretariat of the 
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National Computer Security Incidents Response Teams (CSIRTs) Network, established by 
the Directive on security of network and information systems (NIS Directive). ENISA was 
concerned with improving the EU’s resilience against cyber-attacks, notably by capacity-
building but also by exchanging information and providing analyses. Furthermore, at the 
request of one or more Member States, ENISA assisted Member States in the assessment 
of incidents having a substantial impact by providing expertise and facilitating the 
technical handling of such incidents. It also provided support to ex-post technical 
inquiries and provided the secretariat for the CSIRTs network. 
 
As discussed above, in 2017, a new Act providing for a Cybersecurity Agency was adopted 
which would give ENISA more tasks and resources to assist Member States, e.g. through a 
stronger mandate, a permanent status and more resources. In particular, a core plank of 
its work would relate to an EU framework for cybersecurity certification as an EU-wide 
framework, thereby embedding its institutionalisation into systems.  
 
Whether ENISA can evolve into a major actor remains to be seen in its latest iteration. Its 
international activities are of note with key partners e.g. capacity building with Japan in 
2020. However, its reliance on a vast multitude of (sub-)national and technical actors 
remains it core challenge ― ‘bottom up’ and ‘top down’ ― a group which continues to 
evolve. It challenges its capacity to generate strong and autonomous institutions.  
 
c. EU Cybercrime Centre ‘EC3’: the weakest institutional link? 
Another actor of note is the EU Cybercrime Centre, with the acronym “EC3”, which was 
established in early 2012, operational by 2013 as a ‘desk’ within Europol. The placement 
of the Cybercrime Centre ‘within’ Europol was explicitly part of the Action Plan to 
implement the Stockholm Programme (Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm 
Programme, 2010: 38). Also, the Cybercrime Centre was asserted to complement 
Directives on attacks against Information Systems and the Directive adopted in 2011 on 
combating the sexual exploitation of children online and child pornography (European 
Parliament and Council Proposal 517, 2010; Directive 2011/92/EU, 2011). Its purpose 
was thus institutional and strategic and has been established within an evolving EU 
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agency, the European Police Office, Europol, thereby forming an EU focal point in fighting 
cybercrime, fusing information and informing Member States of threats. While one could 
quibble with the necessity for such an entity and the extent to which it overlaps with other 
agencies such as Europol in particular, but also Interpol, the G8 and Eurojust, Europol was 
asserted at the launch of the Cybercrime Centre to lack resources to gather information 
from a broad range of sources and to lack the specific capacity to deal with requests from 
law enforcements agencies, the judiciary and the private sector (European Commission, 
2012).  The novelty of the Centre was that it purported to adopt a “cross-community 
approach”, to exchange information beyond the law enforcement community, develop a 
common standard for cybercrime reporting and assume the collective voice of cybercrime 
investigation. The Cybercrime Centre was to post liaison officers to the European 
Commission and the European External Action Service as well as to EU agencies (Nielsen, 
2012).  
 
Curiously, the Centre had no express link or nomenclature associated with Cyber security. 
Moreover, its express function is to disrupt organized crime networks and monitor illegal 
activities which begs the question as to what precisely was illegal under EU law, given the 
broad parameters of the existing Framework Decisions and the discretion accorded to 
Member States therein. The establishment of an EU agency to engage in cybercrime 
monitoring prior to the development of a coherent cybercrime and cyber security strategy 
thus lacking overarching legal infrastructure indicates the piecemeal and evolving nature 
of the EU internal policies. If we can say this constitutes an example of extremely weak 
institutionalisation ― and thus a low-water mark of EU action, this is also an important 
observation of the nature of EU institutionalisation taking place, initially antipathetic to 
institutions and lacking clear policies.  
 
d. EU as an International Cyber Actor: Centralised EU Action through the prism of 
International Law 
Beyond individual entities, the EU itself is an increasingly studied actor from an 
international law perspective. Cyberspace is increasingly argued by public international 
law specialists not to constitute a new legal domain (e.g. Buchan, 2018). However, 
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although cyberspace has had a difficult relationship with international law and the Nation 
State, the EU has a ‘healthy’ presence in a variety of international fora (e.g. Odermatt, 
2018). The EUCSS outlines the goal of establishing a coherent international cyberspace 
policy in order to be able to promote EU values (EUCSS, 2013: 3). Thus, significant 
cooperation is also ongoing between the EU and Council of Europe in the area of 
developing best practice in international governance, discussed below. The EU has also 
been involved in bilateral actions with many partners as to cyber activities e.g. EU-US, 
Korea. The EU is also active in many forums where cyber matters are being developed e.g. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA), Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), World Summit on the Information Society 
(WSIS) and the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). Cyber defence policy also requires 
cooperation with key partners such as NATO, given that cyber defence is a core task of 
NATO. CERT-EU has a technical agreement relating to information sharing with the NATO 
Computer incidence response capability. One of the key challenges of EU international 
action is the presentation of coherent positions where within its own organisational 
policies, rules and practices, a multiplicity of positions exist.  
 
The Conclusions on Cyber Diplomacy adopted by the Council on 11 February 2015 gave a 
mandate to the EU and its Member States to uphold freedom, security and prosperity in 
the cyberspace: this includes inter alia, promotion and protection of human rights, 
application of international law and norms of responsible state behaviour, internet 
governance, fight against cybercrime, protection of networks and systems of government 
and critical infrastructure, international cooperation, capacity building, competitiveness 
in the digital market, strategic engagement with key partners. This mandate has been 
labelled as ’ambitious’ in 2019 by the European Parliament (Council, 2015). In late 
November 2017, the Council underlined the need to address cybersecurity with a 
coherent approach at national, EU and global level (Council doc. 14435/17, 2017). This 
newer diplomatic push was of significance given the timings of many key law-making 
efforts. For example, the EU developed key cyber sanctions in the field of malicious attacks 
in the domain of the CFSP immediately prior to the EP elections in 2019 (e.g.  Tsagourias, 
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2019). Cyber-attacks often have an external dimension and in this respect the Council 
refers to its Conclusions of 19 June 2017 on the Framework for a Joint EU Diplomatic 
Response to Malicious Cyber Activities (‘cyber diplomacy toolbox’). The cyber diplomacy 
toolbox sets out measures, including restrictive measures, which can be used to prevent 
and respond to malicious cyber activities.  
 
Then on 28 June 2018, the European Council, in its Conclusions, called on institutions and 
Member States to implement the measures referred to in the Joint Communication on 
increasing resilience and bolstering capabilities to address hybrid threats, including the 
work on attribution of cyber-attacks and the practical use of the cyber diplomacy toolbox.   
 
On 18 October 2018, the European Council adopted conclusions calling for work on the 
capacity to respond to and deter cyber-attacks through EU restrictive measures to be 
taken forward. As a follow up, on 17 May 2019, the Council adopted the necessary legal 
acts establishing a framework for targeted restrictive measures to deter and respond to 
cyber-attacks with a significant effect which constitute an external threat to the Union or 
its Member States. As noted above, these acts also allow for restrictive measures to be 
applied in response to cyber-attacks with a significant effect against third States or 
international organisations, pursuant to Article 21 TEU and significantly enhance the 
unitary nature of the EU’s response ― de facto and de jure institutionalising to a degree, 
subject to the issues raised above. 
 
 
V. EXTERNAL EU CYBER LAW-MAKING 
a. Incomplete International cyber law-making: A lack of institutionalisation 
Significant non-state governance in the cyber domain have transformed the meaning of 
national territory and sovereignty (Fahey, 2018). Digital space is a major new theatre for 
capital accumulation and global capital. Alternatively, cyberspace can be said to constitute 
a new domain ― but not an unprecedented one per se, whereby the challenges that it 
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poses for states are similar to those that the international community has faced in the past 
as to other domains, such as the international law governing the high seas, outer space 
and Antarctica (Eichensher, 2015:321). One may argue that there are more actors, spaces, 
communities and users of cyberspace such that it lacks a comparator. Much theorisation 
on the notion of cyberspace was derived from the 1980s and science fiction. Cyberspace, 
however, is increasingly argued by public international law specialists not to constitute a 
new legal domain (Buchan, 2018). Cyberspace has had a difficult relationship with 
international law and the Nation State because there is still no cyber multilateral or 
uniform cyber law as an instrument of international law which is all encompassing. Cyber 
law-making is a predominantly global affair and yet its de-centralisation through 
according powers to powerful global private entities continues to be paradoxical 
(Carrapiço and Farrand, 2018). The role of such private entities in cyber law-making 
appears as the antithesis of global law-making. However, at a global level, there is no 
global cyber pact and Russia, the US and China remain key stumbling blocks to global 
reform, discussed next. The paper examines UN and Council of Europe reforms and the 
EU’s role in the latter. 
 
UN level 
There has been a series of resolutions and five UN Groups of Governmental Experts on 
Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of 
International Security. The latest UN Group, in June 2017, witnessed the refusal of China, 
Russia and Cuba to adopt a paragraph on the applicability of self-defense, 
countermeasures and the law of armed conflicts in cyberspace. More recently, the 
international community has moved one step closer to the risk of fragmentation during 
the last session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2018. The General 
Assembly of the United Nations adopted two resolutions following on the failure of the 
2016-2017 UN GGE, both resolutions calling for the creation of a process to follow up on 
the past UN GGE processes. Having two parallel processes discussing the application of 
international law to cyberspace, initiated by two different groups of States with divergent 
approaches on the application of some norms of international law, contribute to the risk 
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of geographical fragmentation (Delarue, 2019).  It is thus a more fragile context broadly 
overall.  
 
Council of Europe level: fostering stronger institutionalised ties? 
The Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention (‘Budapest Convention’) forms the basis 
for all EU, EU-US and to some extent US law as a form of ‘transnational gold standard’. The 
Budapest Convention on Cybercrime was opened for signature in 2001. Membership in 
this treaty increases continuously and any country able to implement its provisions may 
seek accession. By September 2019, 64 States had become Parties and a further 8 had 
signed it or been invited to accede. In addition to these 72 States a further 28 are believed 
to have legislation largely in line with this treaty and a further 52 to have drawn on it at 
least partially (see also Fahey, 2014). The Budapest Convention is supplemented by an 
additional Protocol on Xenophobia and Racism committed via computer systems. Much 
EU Criminal law has its origins in Council of Europe Conventions because of their 
tendency to set best international practice and to organise regimes of considerable merit 
(Mitseligas, 2009; Korff, 2013). The Cybercrime Convention is now seen as major 
transnational venue for internet reform but this has not always been the case. The 
Cybercrime Convention has been criticised by civil society as too heavily reflecting law 
enforcement standards and its relationship with the broader regulatory framework of the 
Council of Europe and large-scale standards on data protection remains less than 
persuasive (Brown, 2014: 3.3). In particular, the Convention is perceived by privacy 
advocates as a broad but not the broadest international forum, whereby the UN forms the 
apex thereof (Brown, 2014). The US is not a member of the Council of Europe but took a 
significant part in the drafting of the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention and has 
signed and ratified it domestically, as have approximately half the Member States of the 
EU (Ratification Table, 2019; Fahey, 2014: 368). In the wake of the NSA affair, the 
Cybercrime Convention has been touted by the US in EU-US negotiations on its aftermath 
recently as setting particularly high international standards in privacy and data 
protection and as evidence of the willingness of the US to lead and set such standards 
(Council doc.16987/13, 2013; European Commission Communication 846, 2013).  
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The Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention adopts a broad perspective on cybercrime. 
In fact, it is much criticised for its overbroad content, its lack of provision for cross-border 
enforcement and its obligations imposed upon Internet Service Providers (Goldsmith, 
2001; Porcedda, 2011) and also that it does not purport to regulate cyber security. The 
Convention distinguishes between four types of offences which as a typology may be 
argued not to be wholly consistent in that three of the types of offences focus upon legal 
protection whereas the fourth does not and leads as a result to overlap between the 
categories. In addition, criminal acts such as cyber terrorism or phishing cover acts may 
fall within several categories (Gercke, 2012). The Convention does not contain as many 
definitional conceptions of cybercrime as other regional legislative models do, which may 
appear surprising given its tendency towards harmonisation rather than closing gaps in 
regulation.  Nonetheless, it is the most far-reaching multilateral agreement on cybercrime 
in existence, purporting to harmonise national legislation procedurally. Substantively, its 
suitability as a ‘gold-standard’ source of regulation ― pan-European and beyond ― may 
be open to question.  
 
There is a particular emphasis in contemporary Council of Europe Cybercrime policy as 
to its reform upon the dichotomy of hard and soft law and the relevance of jurisdiction, 
conceptual focusses that appear surprising (Council of Europe, 2010). For example, the 
Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights has encouraged states not to use data 
obtained from servers in another country under informal arrangements but instead to use 
mutual assistance arrangements (Korff, 2014). Moreover, from the perspective of the 
Council of Europe, placing limits on the extra-territorial exercise of jurisdiction in relation 
to transnational cybercrimes has also been argued to be essential. This position has much 
resonance in contemporary US law where the extra-territorial use of law is widely 
advocated (Hathaway et al, 2012). Yet what should the Convention be aiming for? Is its 
focus in reality conventional rather than progressive? Such a focus appears troubling from 
the ‘transnational gold-standard’, as one centered exclusively around enforcement as 
opposed to rights-based rule-making. Its unequivocal stance as the leading cyber law 
instrument draws attention to its less than holistic integration of other regimes even 
within the Council of Europe, its rights-based conceptions of rule-making in this field and 
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its incompleteness as an instrument. The lack of any meaningful engagement between the 
Convention and the reform of related UN measures also raises the question as to regime 
interaction or lack thereof and the ideal of ‘holistic’ rule. 
  
The Parties to the Budapest Convention have been searching for solutions for some time, 
that is, from 2012 to 2014 through a working group on transborder access to data and 
from 2015 to 2017 through the Cloud Evidence Group. In June 2017, the Cybercrime 
Convention Committee (T-CY) agreed on the Terms of Reference for the preparation of 
the Protocol and negotiations commenced in September 2017 on: Provisions on more 
efficient mutual legal assistance; Provisions on direct cooperation with providers in other 
jurisdictions; Framework and safeguards for existing practices of extending searches 
transborder; Rule of law and data protection safeguards. The Parties to the Convention 
have been looking to reform access to electronic evidence by judicial and police 
authorities through a Second Additional Protocol which would address those challenges 
by ensuring greater international cooperation. The negotiations on the Protocol started 
in June 2017 and are due to be concluded at the time of writing. They mostly have not 
sought institutionalised outcomes.  
 
b. Can the EU institutionalise at regional level? 
The EU has had to consider the protection of privacy and personal data (as specified in 
the General Data Protection Regulation, the e-Privacy Directive and the Data Protection 
Directive for Police and Criminal Justice Authorities) and the development of EU rules on 
electronic evidence relative to third countries. In its negotiation directives, the EU has 
raised the issue as to consistency with respect to e-evidence regimes and third countries, 
in particular the US. Two recommendations to participate in the Second Additional 
protocol and to open negotiations with the US were being adopted by the Commission at 
the same time. The Commission and other EU institutions are observers in the Protocol 
Drafting Plenary  (European Commission Recommendations 70; 71, 2019). An EU specific 
‘disconnection’ clause appeared to raised challenges for a guarantee that only EU law, 
whether existing or future, will be applied as between EU Member States. However, where 
the Budapest Convention already contains a provision which should meet the concerns of 
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the European Union not to compromise its normative acquis or the autonomy of its 
legislative process (Legal Opinion on Budapest Cybercrime Convention, 2019). 
 These issues as to the autonomy of EU law should not be discounted since they 
demonstrate an increasing challenge for the sui generis nature of EU law when engaging 
with international law-making. The autonomy of EU law has emerged as a complex 
statement of EU distinctiveness. It appears to increasingly inhibit institutionalisation 
beyond the State (e.g. CJEU Opinion 2/13 ECHR accession) (Eckes, 2013). Amendments to 
the Budapest Convention  demonstrate the challenges of the EU seeking to act as a global 
actor and a very important limitation of the ‘global’ in a forum where the EU can, in theory, 
influence the global. EU’s own internal taxonomies hinder it in institutionalising further 
and evolving international organisations’ positions. This, however, is also a broader 
phenomenon of EU International relations law where the autonomy of EU law operates 
as a barrier to deeper institutionalisation.  
 
VI. Concluding reflections  
 
The EU’s cyber law-making appears long dominated by weak efforts at institutionalisation 
and few actors. This could radically change given the unfolding internal market directions 
of cyber law-making. The reality of cyber law is, however, dominated by a need to use 
CFSP and criminal law powers and sanctions and the overall matrix of law-making 
appears increasingly skewed in different directions, destined towards partial 
institutionalisation and weaker actors.  
 
This paper has outlined how EU law appears divided between cybercrime and cyber 
security in a manner which is not always logical or effective. The divisions feed into other 
challenges ― e.g. how it relates to privacy or human rights, fair procedures, administrative 
justice, defence of the state, private companies and individuals etc. A more holistic and 
unified approach would enable the EU to engage more meaningfully at International level.  
Cybercrime and security constitute one of the most useful examples of transnational law 
making and global governance. EU cybercrime and security law-making are thus taking 
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place in a vacuum against a backdrop of complex international law-making regimes only 
under development. Its own complexity as an international organisation increasingly is 
also apparent as the Budapest Convention developments amply demonstrate.  
 
The EU as a cyber-actor appears to institutionalise cyber-matters increasingly yet is also 
subject to an increasingly wide variety of subjects and objects that it cannot 
institutionalise. Major developments in EU cyber action internally and externally 
increasingly focus upon both institutionalisation and also the co-opting of private actors 
into governance which are not consistent.  Significant legal competences have been 
accorded in criminal law and AFSJ and CFSP law-making over successive treaty changes 
but this is not optimally reflected yet in cyber law-making.  
 
The paper has argued that cyber law-making must become a holistic and joined-up study 
as a matter of law and needs to traverse the internal and external of EU law more explicitly 
and transparently. While many of the challenges affecting EU law-making in the cyber 
domain are equally evident at international level, EU divergences inhibit further 
institutionalisation.  
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